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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The increasing interconnection between computers through the Internet has emerged
the vision of Application Layer Networks. Application Layer Networks comprise an
abstract view on overlay networks (e.g. Peer-to-Peer networks, Grid infrastructures) on
top of the TCP/IP protocol. Their common characteristic is the redundant, distributed
provisioning and access of data, computation or application services, while hiding the
heterogeneity of the service network from the user’s view [ERA+03].
A promising example for Application Layer Networks are Computational Grids. In
the Computational Grid, computer resources such as processors or hard disks can be ac-
cessed in analogy to the power grid in a plug-and-play environment. A user has access to
a reliable virtual computer, which consists of many heterogeneous computer resources.
These resources are not visible to the user - such as a consumer of electric power is
unaware of how the demanded electricity is being generated and thereafter transmitted
to the power socket.
At the moment, most of the research done in the area of Application Layer Networks
focuses in particular on the hardware and software infrastructure, such that from a tech-
nical point of view, "the access to resources is dependable, consistent, pervasive, and
inexpensive" [FK04]. Nonetheless, there are still barriers preventing the deployment of
large-scaled Peer-to-Peer networks or Computational Grids.
One of the key issues in building such networks is to determine which computer
resources are allocated to which service and scheduled at what time. Most existing ap-
proaches such as Legion [COBW00], Condor [FTF+01], or Gnutella [FFRS02, KSTT04]
employ optimization algorithms, which allocate and schedule resources based on static
3
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system specific cost functions [BAGS02, BAV04].
However, static system specific cost functions typically lead to economically in-
efficient allocations [BAGS02, BAV04]. These functions do not guarantee that those
demanding users will receive their supplied resources who value them highest. Further-
more, these functions ignore the fact that users owning resources only have incentives
offering resources, if they are adequately compensated. Compensation requires deter-
mining how the supplied resources are allocated among potential buyers and how the
prices for the resources are set. However, for implementing economic efficient Appli-
cation Layer Networks both described aspects are crucial.
Recently, the application of market mechanisms for allocating and scheduling ser-
vices and resources in Application Layer Networks has been increasingly suggested
[BAGS02, WPBB01b]. According to Hurwicz, markets can be an efficient institution
to allocate resources (Pareto-) optimal [Hur72]. This is achieved by the interplay of
demand and supply and due to the information feedback inherent to the price system.
As such, the application of market mechanisms to Application Layer Networks as an
allocation and scheduling mechanism is deemed promising.
1.2 CATNETS Scenario
Figure 1.1: CATNETS Scenario: Service Market and Resource Market
The scenario that is envisioned in CATNETS is, that there is a set of services (e.g.
services to create a PDF or to convert a MP3 file), a set of agents demanding these ser-
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vices for a specific job (e.g. an agent wants to create a PDF file), and a set of resources
capable providing computational resources for executing these services (e.g. a proces-
sor, main memory, and a hard disk for creating the PDF file). However, an agent that
is requesting a service is unaware of the resources the requested service requires to be
carried out.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the CATNETS scenario. An agent is requesting a PDF creator
service, which will be allocated to the agent. Furthermore, the required resources (CPU
and hard disk) are allocated to the service. The service acts as a trading intermediary,
i.e. the service knows what the agents are demanding and which resources are available
for executing the services.
The objective of working package 1 (WP1: Market Engineering) in this project is
to engineer a market place for such a scenario. This can be achieved by designing (in-
terdependent) market mechanisms for allocating the services among the agents and for
allocating and scheduling the resources among the services in two different markets: the
Service Market and the Resource Market.
The difficulty in designing such markets is that the underlying mechanisms through
which the participants act can have a profound impact on the results of that interaction
[Jac02b]. For instance, in a sealed bid auction the bidders simultaneously submit bids to
the auctioneer without knowledge of the amount bid by other participants. In contrast,
all bids under an open cry auction are available for everyone to see. Thus, in a sealed
bid auction mechanism the participants do not learn as much about the valuations of
the other participants as in an open cry auction. The higher information feedback may
affect the bidding behavior of the market participants and could therefore lead to differ-
ent outcomes. Furthermore, the market infrastructure (e.g. ways of communication) as
well as the business structure (e.g. trading fees) can also influence the behavior of the
participants and therefore the outcome of the mechanism [WHN03, Neu04b].
The Market Engineering approach chosen in this WP manages these influences by
means of a structured, systematic, and theoretically profound procedure of analyzing,
designing, evaluating, and introducing electronic market platforms [WHN03].
Appropriating the methodology of Market Engineering – which will be introduced
in Section 2 – the following objectives constitute the outline of this report: In Chapter
3, the Service Market will be analyzed and the requirements a mechanism for this sce-
nario has to fulfill will be defined. In Chapter 4, the Resource Market will be analyzed
and characterized, as well as the requirements for this market will be elicited. Finally,
Chapter 5 summarizes the contribution and gives an overview on future work.
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Chapter 2
Market Engineering Approach
In the general context of engineering, a design method refers to a way, procedure, or
technique for solving an individual design problem1. These design methods can be
either intuitive or discursive:
• Intuitive approaches involve creativity in the form of complex associations of
ideas and aim at increasing the flow of ideas (e.g. using the Delphi method
[PB84]). However, the results of intuitive approaches strongly depend on the
designer’s expertise, skills, and experiences. As such, intuitive approaches may
fail to achieve suitable solutions for complex problems.
• Discursive approaches are strategies which decompose a complex design problem
into several smaller, less complex problems. The design strategy intends to de-
scribe a step-by-step procedure to aid the designer in the matching of the unique
problem situation along the overall design process with the available design meth-
ods.
The design of a market mechanism is a complex and interdependent task. Therefore,
the approach of Market Engineering aims at the discursive, goal-oriented development
of market institutions.
The Market Engineering Process Model is built upon the engineering design model
proposed by [PB84]. In essence, the choice of the engineering design approach al-
lows the explicit anchoring of two fundamental desiderata into the Market Engineering
process model:
1. utilization of economic models in the design process and
2. the use of behavioral and cognitive models to determine the needs and require-
ments of the potential customers and stakeholders.
1Parts of this text are taken from [Neu04b]
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The first desideratum is very powerful, as it allows the integration of economic mod-
eling into the Market Engineering process. Market Engineering hence is not neglecting
prior work on the field of economic design, but can incorporate it into the process. Eco-
nomic design is essentially concerned with social effects in markets derived from the
analysis of abstract resource allocation mechanisms. Analogous to engineering design
that deduces solution principles on the basis of physical effects, Market Engineering can
make use of the social effects2 to derive solution principles. The second desideratum is
also of great importance in the design of market mechanism, as it primarily addresses
social issues with many different customers involved. As such, the engineering design
template is additionally enriched by elements of the service development process devel-
oped in marketing [SJ89].
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Design and Implementation
Preliminary Electronic Market
Tested Electronic Market
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Parametric Design
Mechanism Design
Primal Dual Programming
Morphological Design
Surveys
Interviews
SWOT Analysis
Joint Application Development
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Labor-Experiments
Computational Game
Problem Solver
Process Methods
Figure 2.1: Stages of the Market Engineering Process
The corresponding Market Engineering process model and a selection of associated
methods are outlined in figure 2.1 [WHN03] and briefly described in the following. The
objectives and the strategy that governs the Market Engineering approach stand at the
2Social effects are here defined very broadly as all regularities that depend on specific interpersonal
interactions.
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outset of the Market Engineering process. In the first stage - the environmental analysis
- the requirements of the new market mechanism are deduced. In the second stage, the
new market mechanism is designed and implemented. Having implemented the appro-
priate market mechanism, it is tested upon its economic properties and its operational
functionality in the third stage. At any stage of the Market Engineering process, there is
a decision to be made whether to proceed with the next step or to repeat the prior one.
The use of prototypes is again possible at any stage of the process, so that they are left
out in the figure. The Market Engineering process not only structures the design process
but also provides the designer with a whole array of methods that may support the indi-
vidual sub-tasks. In the following each stage of the process is described particularly.
However, a detailed description of the single stages and the associated methods can
be found in [Neu04b] and [Hol04].
2.1 Phase 1: Environmental Analysis
The environmental analysis stands at the outset of the market-engineering process. Ba-
sically, the term environment is used to describe the set of all individual circumstances
in a market that are outside the control of the mechanism designer [Hur73]. Among
others, these circumstances can be the number of potential participants, their character-
istics of the participants (e.g., preferences, risk aversion), their social relations among
each other, the characteristics of the resources, or the individual resource endowments
[Smi89]. Since the performance of market mechanisms is inherently dependent on the
underlying environment, the design of a market mechanism requires profound knowl-
edge about the environment.
The environmental analysis is triggered by the specification of the objectives and
the strategy of the designer. Objective of the environmental analysis stage is twofold:
Firstly, the identification of a promising market segment for which a market mechanism
is considered. Secondly, the analysis of the requirements potential adopters may have
regarding the market mechanism. Corresponding with the engineering design process,
this stage comprises two different phases: the environment definition and the require-
ment analysis.
2.1.1 Environment Definition
The central intuition of the environment definition phase is to pinpoint the environment
for which subsequently the market mechanism is offered. The environment definition
is clearly a marketing task. To systematize the phase more thoroughly, the environment
definition is divided into three subsequent activities:
CATNETS/2005/D1/v1.0 Revised Date 8
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1. Market Definition,
2. Market Segmentation, and
3. Market Targeting.
Firstly, the relevant market is defined. In other words, the market designer is "carv-
ing out the arena in which it is going to compete for business" [FA03]. The market
definition thus comprises information about the potential market participants, their ge-
ographical positions, their specific needs, and so forth. In short, the market definition3
characterizes the demand-side for the market mechanism that is eventually determined
by the definition of the trading object.
Secondly - having defined the relevant market - the designer divides the defined mar-
ket into several segments. The division into segments is intended to disaggregate total
demand into smaller pieces of demand. The smaller pieces of demand are ideally of
homogenous nature such that it is easier to fine-tune the market mechanism to the needs
of this market segment [FA03, Smi56].
Thirdly, the market segments are evaluated against each other. As a result, the target
market consisting of one or more market segments is selected [HR86].
2.1.2 Requirement Analysis
Basically, the target market segment reveals the environment for which the market
mechanism is intended. In order to gain potential agents as customers, the market mech-
anism must match with the particular needs of the agents. The requirement analysis
phase consists of a thorough extraction of the potential customers’ needs concerning the
resource allocation problem and the environmental side-constraints [BCZ92, SSS00].
In other words, the requirement analysis seeks to describe the socio-economic environ-
ment consisting of the (potential) number of agents, their preference structure and risk
attitude, the number of resources to be offered, their characteristics, and the agents’
endowment. [Cra03] summarizes this as follows: "Good market design begins with a
thorough understanding of the market participants, their incentives, and the economic
problem that the market is trying to solve".
Common elicitation techniques for requirement analysis can be distinguished into
three broad categories [BCZ92].
3The terms market definition, segmentation, and targeting have been established in marketing for a
long time. As such, these terms are also used in this report, although the definition of the term "market" is
not exactly corresponding with the institutional definition given here. What marketing literature addresses
with the term "market" is the environment, whereas the market mechanisms are left out.
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• Observation techniques
• Unstructured elicitation techniques
• Structured elicitation techniques.
In summary, the result of the requirement analysis ideally comprises the following as-
pects: a description of the socio-economic environment (agents, resources, and prefer-
ences), the legal framework, and a requirement list what objectives the market mecha-
nism must attain, and lastly what properties it must have.
2.2 Phase 2: Design and Implementation
The second stage – headlined as design and implementation – comprises the actual de-
sign process. It commences when the design problem has been sufficiently specified.
Obviously, the aim of this phase is twofold. Firstly, the conceptual design of an ap-
propriate market mechanism on the blackboard, and, secondly, its transformation into a
running software system. Following the engineering design process, the design and im-
plementation stage is decomposed into four major phases being the conceptual design,
embodiment design, detail design and implementation
2.2.1 Conceptual Design
The second stage – headlined as design and implementation – comprises the actual de-
sign process. It commences when the design problem has been sufficiently specified.
The conceptual design step hallmarks the peculiarity that distinguishes the Market
Engineering from the service development process. Essentially the design problem is
abstracted in a way that the design object is abstracted to its functions. As the design
object is the market mechanism, it has the function to allocate resources, provide the
customers with information, enforce the allocation, sue infringements and so on. The
recourse to abstraction simply means "ignoring what is particular or incidental and em-
phasizing what is general and essential" [PB84].
Those functions are further divided into sub-functions reducing the overall complex-
ity of the design problem. Then, the sub-functions are distinguished into important (i.e.
main) or less important (i.e. auxiliary) functions. Important functions are tackled within
the conceptual design phase, whereas the design of auxiliary functions is postponed to
the embodiment phase.
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Transferred to Market Engineering, the functions are also solved by means of so-
cial effects [Ore01]. Different than in engineering design, the entities that cause these
effects are not form attributes of material, but a set of rules. For example, the designer
may want to satisfy the function of an efficient resource allocation. In this case, the
designer searches for market mechanisms that achieve this function. Suggestions from
literature show that there are two methodologies available, which are concerned with the
design of market mechanisms on the abstract level, namely primal/dual programming,
and mechanism design [KP03]:
Primal/dual Programming [BO00]: The technique of primal/dual programming mod-
els the allocation problem as the primal the price determination as the dual problem. If
the complementary slackness conditions are satisfied, the allocation at the given price is
efficient. This approach can be translated into an iterative auction format. The auction-
eer announces the standing highest price – the agents report their utility maximizing bid
without considering the other agents’ reactions. The auctioneer collects those new bids
and determines the new provisional allocation. Then, the auctioneer verifies whether
the complementary slackness condition is satisfied. If so the auction terminates with the
given price and allocation, if not the price is raised. This approach – although mathe-
matically elegant – requires the agents to report their bids myopically. This assumption
is very rigid, as it assumes the agents to behave as price takers. If this assumption is
violated the approach does not produce reliable results4.
Mechanism Design [Jac02b]: Mechanism Design is a very elegant way to compute
the optimal mechanism that attains the desired objective5. In essence, the mechanism
that maximizes the objective function (e.g. social welfare) subject to the individual ra-
tionality constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint is the optimal mechanism
[Led93]. Obviously, the mechanism design approach is very information intense, as it
requires detailed information about the distribution of the environment. In the engineer-
ing practice, the mechanism design approach is accordingly of limited use6.
Both approaches generate an abstract description of the market mechanism consist-
ing of an allocation and price function.
The resulting abstract solution descriptions to all functions are aggregated into con-
cepts. The concepts are furthermore supplemented by a calculation of profitability pre-
dicting the chances of the envisioned market mechanism in the competition. Finally, it
4One approach to heal primal/dual programming is to set incentives such that the agents behave as
price takers [AM02].
5Alternatively, it is also possible to compute the outcomes of a given mechanism in a specific envi-
ronment. This strategy is typically adopted by auction theory [Mil04]
6Other reasons can be found in [Neu04a]
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is decided upon which concept – including abstract descriptions of the service enriched
by profitability estimates – is further adopted.
2.2.2 Embodiment Design
While the conceptual design phase is concerned with the formulation of the problem and
the search for abstract solutions, the embodiment design refines the abstract concepts to
blueprints. A blueprint denotes a model that is more concrete than the concepts, but
still independent of implementation details. In other words, the concept comprises at
most a verbal description of the market mechanism. As such, many different blueprints
can be found that realize the same concept. During the embodiment design this ver-
bal descriptions are transformed into a model with sufficiently low level of abstraction
that traditional design techniques may be applied in order to implement it: the concept
becomes form [PB84].
Those blueprints comprise at least four main aspects:
Identifying processes One of the primary strengths of a blueprint is that it can visualize
the processes necessary for providing the transaction service. A blueprint for
the market mechanism aggregates the refined (sub-) functions of the conceptual
design phase to processes. Apparently, the determination of a blueprint requires
the specification of the interconnections among the (sub-) functions. Once, the
processes are identified they can be analyzed upon fail points or time frames.
Isolating fail points The identification of the processes helps to analyze the critical
process steps. In particular, the blueprint as analysis tool allows optimizing the
entire process. Critical process steps for instance can be redundantly secured
against failure by fail-safe processes or certain time-critical process steps can be
automated [Sho84]. For any market mechanism the engagement of the customers
is potentially critical. Generally the interface between customer and service sys-
tem affects the customer satisfaction, which in turn strongly influences customer
loyalty [JS95]. Unsatisfied customers may defect and will subsequently not be
available to act as a co-producer of the service. This may exacerbate the quality
of the overall service.
Establishing time frame A blueprint can also reveal information about the execution
time, i.e. how long it takes to execute the single process steps. On the other
hand, does the blueprint help to accelerate certain process steps. By identifying
the potential bottlenecks the service system can be streamlined. Moreover, it is
possible to establish reasonable time-of-service-execution standards.
Establishing cost analysis As soon as the processes and the corresponding time frames
are established, it is possible to develop a thorough cost analysis. The cost analy-
sis can also render the costs per any sub-process given a certain service system.
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The main difficulty in embodiment design is that commonly "developers translate
the subjective description of a need into an operational concept that may bear only the
remote resemblance of the original idea" [Sho84]. As blueprints are, "[. . .] more pre-
cise than verbal descriptions of the service processes and therefore reduce ambiguity
and the likelihood of misunderstandings that may originate from them" [HRRM00].
Furthermore, the technique of blueprinting almost prevents the designer from concep-
tual errors, because the blueprint allows " [. . .] the creation, study, and testing of ser-
vices conceptually on paper before costly implementation" [HRRM00]. There are many
methods that satisfy these four objectives of blueprints. The most common models that
are presented in the context of blueprinting are flow diagrams or PERT (i.e. program
evaluation and review technique) charts7 [HRRM00, Sho82, Sho84]. The methodol-
ogy Blueprinting tailored to embodiment design converting concepts into protocols is
described in [Neu04a].
2.2.3 Detail Design and Implementation
The detail design phase starts out with the layout, which describes the central aspects of
the system, but is still at a level that is not implementable. Detail design further refines
the layout into a fully-fledged system model that is subsequently implemented. Appar-
ently, this phase accounts for the software engineering effort in Market Engineering.
From the software development point of view, the precedent design phases of the
Market Engineering process can be subsumed under the term requirement analysis. Dif-
ferent than the traditional sequence of interviews, or the use of Joint Application Devel-
opment (JAD) meetings conducted by professional modelers, the Market Engineering
process provides the designers with a systematic approach to collect design informa-
tion from the experts. In other words, the precedent design phases of the market design
process converts the activities of gathering, figuring out, and communicating what to
build [HB95] into a closed discursive approach8.
By doing so, the Market Engineering process supports the arguably most important
step in the requirement analysis [DHDJ99].
Once the designer has a clear idea how the market mechanism will look like (by
7Broadly speaking, PERT charts visualize tasks, durations, and dependencies among task. Each chart
starts with an initial node from which the first task(s) originates. The tasks are represented by arrows,
which indicate the identifiers of the tasks, the durations, the number of people assigned to them, and
sometimes even the names of the employees involved. The arrow points at another node, which identifies
the start of another task, or the beginning of any slack time. Related techniques are CPM or GANTT
charts.
8The Market Engineering process thereby follows the four phases of the requirement analysis, con-
ceptual design, logical design, validation and formal specification proposed by [BCZ92, Zmu83].
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means of the layout), an ordinary software development process can be started. State-
of-the art approaches like the V-model [Som01, TH93] supplemented by methods such
as the FUSION [CAB+94] or Coad/Yourdon [CY91a, CY91b] and tools such as UML
[OF99, RJB99] are available such that the software engineering process will not further
be elaborated.
Detail design is, however, more than software engineering – detail design phase is
also concerned with the concretization of the business rules. Up to this point, only the
key data concerning the business rules such as target costs and price ranges for the mar-
ket mechanism exist. Once the properties of the market are clarified, reliable pricing
schemes can be developed.
The end of the detail design and implementation is reached, when the market mech-
anism is fully implemented.
2.3 Phase 3: Testing
Having implemented the market mechanism, it is tested. Stage 3 denotes, however, not
testing in general but the final acceptance test before the market mechanism is rolled
out. The inclusion of a separated testing stage may also account for the case that the
designer has sourced the implementation task out. The designer will then only accept
the software system if it passes their acceptance testing. Apparently, the inclusion of a
testing stage does certainly not exclude testing along the entire design process; it rather
provides the designer with decision support whether or not the system can be launched
in the field.
Nevertheless, the term acceptance testing is used here in a broad sense meaning all
activities "used in quality control operations to decide between acceptance and rejection
of production lots based upon an inspection of selected items" [MCM75]. What is tested
is the software quality, and the quality of the service. While the former testing checks
the functionality of the service system, the latter refers to the outcome of the market
mechanism in economic terms (such as efficiency). Thus, the testing stage comprises
two different testing phases before release: functionality and concerning economic per-
formance testing.
When the market mechanism passed through the functionality (acceptance) test, it
is tested concerning its economic performance. Now the question arises, how economic
performance can be evaluated? This question is extremely difficult, as the outcome is
determined by the behavior of the agents and not by the mechanism. Milgrom summa-
rizes the problems with behavior as follows: "Behavior is neither perfectly stable over
CATNETS/2005/D1/v1.0 Revised Date 14
Environmental Analysis for Application Layer Networks
time, nor the same across individuals, nor completely predictable for any single indi-
vidual. Useful analyses must be cognizant of these realities" [Mil04]. In the discipline
of economic engineering there are two approaches to address the evaluation problem of
institutions:
• Axiomatic Approach
• Experimental Approach
The axiomatic approach imposes a couple assumptions upon human behavior and
calculates equilibrium strategies. With those equilibrium strategies, the performance of
the institution can be calculated.
Alternatively, the experimental approach exposes humans to the institution, who
will autonomously form their strategy. To make the laboratory experiment comparable,
the demand and supply situation is induced to the participating human by means of a
monetary incentive scheme. Hence, the performance of an institution depends on the
real social interplay among the agents.
2.3.1 Axiomatic Approach
Standard economic theory has bred out two standard paradigms with different assump-
tions upon agent behavior pervading economic modeling:
1. The first paradigm is bolstered by welfare economics. Agents are in these models
assumed to maximize their individual utility no matter what the others do. In a
market context this implies that the buying agents are price-takers, as they take
the announced price as given and act accordingly.
2. The second paradigm pertains to game theory. Agents are assumed to choose their
optimal strategy conditional on the rival agents’ reactions.
The first paradigm usually assumes a behavior that can be described as myopic-best
response. In myopic-best response the agents behave such that their utility is maxi-
mized, taking the behavior of all other agents as unchanged. Apparently, it is assumed
that the own action has no impact on the other agents’ reaction. Equilibrium is reached
when no agent can improve its utility [KP03].
The second paradigm stems from game theory. Accordingly, the agents choose their
utility-maximizing strategy conditional on the rival agents’ reaction. An equilibrium is
characterized by the fact that all agents play their best-response strategy to each other.
This implies that a single agent cannot increase its utility by a unilateral deviation from
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the equilibrium [FT00]. Those strategies are easy to compute, as it involves no antici-
pation of the other agents’ strategies [WMMRS03].
By the classification into game-theoretic and price taking behavior it implicitly
raises the question, how complex a problem must be before the game-theoretic ratio-
nale loses its predictive power [KP03, Led93]. Accordingly, it is often assumed that the
second paradigm is often used to reflect situation, where only a small number of agents
are participating. The first paradigm may reflect agent behavior fairly well, when the
number of agents is sufficiently large or when there is uncertainty concerning the pref-
erences.
However, despite the nice properties of myopic-best response, this strategy has two
major drawbacks. Firstly, myopic-best response is only meaningful for iterative auc-
tions. Secondly, it is in many cases not rational, as there exists better strategies. Myopic-
best response would thus neither maximize the agents’ utilities nor attain allocative ef-
ficiency [MMORW04]. Nonetheless, myopic best response models work well when the
number of agents is large.
Analytical Models It is principally possible to solve for these equilibria analytically.
Analytical models rely on "stark and exaggerated assumptions to reach theoretical con-
clusions" [Mil04]. Typically, mechanism theory assumes that:
• Agents’ valuations are well formed and describable in terms of probabilities,
• Differences in the valuations are fully reflected by differences in the information,
and
• Agents maximize their utility and expect other agents to be utility maximizing
entities as well.
Additionally, the models impose even more restrictive assumptions (such as symme-
try of the agents etc.) upon the models to make them tractable [Mil04]. The conclusions
of the analytical models may "fail miserably" when the assumptions may not reflect re-
ality. In reality the strategic behavior and the environment is more complex than in the
models. In those cases optimal (i.e. utility-maximizing) strategies are rarely found. As
a consequence, analytical models can be used for developing intuition but not for eval-
uation of market mechanism. Furthermore, as [Mil04] noted, do state-of-the-art models
only capture a very small subset of issues of the market mechanism.
Apparently, economic performance testing has to cope with the problem that the an-
alytical derivation of the optimal strategies is impossible due to the inherent complexity
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the models want to capture. Restricting attention to ad-hoc strategies and their impact
on the economic performance may, however, entail false conclusions, as these ad-hoc
strategies can be arbitrarily far from the optimal strategy [RWMMO04].
Computational Methods One direct way to evaluate the performance of market mech-
anism is simply to the equilibria. For myopic best response models this is straightfor-
ward, as the agents’ strategies can be easily computed with having to deal with bidding
interdependencies. For the case of game-theoretic modeling this is more complicated,
as one has to compute the optimal strategies in equilibrium. For computing Nash equi-
libria numerically, current computational game solver, such as Gambit, fail to compute
even small problems in a reasonable amount of time [KP03]. This failure stems from
the size of the strategy space, which is simply huge.
Another possibility is to reduce the strategy space and compute the equilibrium
based on this strategy space. It still can happen that the problem is computationally
intractable, as Wellman et al. report [WMMRS03].
Several different approaches for computational methods can be identified:
• Computational Game Solver: As aforementioned, Gambit is computational game
solver for solving finite games. In essence, it uses the full pay-off matrix and
successively eliminates strongly dominated strategies. Then, it performs a sim-
plicial subdivision algorithm for finding at least one mixed strategy equilibrium
to any n-person game [MMT00]. The major drawback of computational game
solvers is, as aforementioned, that even small games cannot be processed within
a reasonable timeframe [KP03]9.
• Evolutionary Tournament: Originally the interpretation of a Nash equilibrium
aims at its evolutionary character. Accordingly, the Nash equilibrium denotes the
end point of an evolutionary process, where the agents subsequently adjust their
strategies. This evolutionary intuition can be formalized by replicator dynam-
ics.10 In replicator dynamics, it is the idea that not the individual agents learn
but the society as a whole. Initially, a set of pure strategies and the proportion
by how many agents of the population these strategies are adopted is given. A
strategy that has proven its usefulness is replicated and thus stronger represented
in the population. Once the proportions of the population playing a pure strat-
egy remains constant and none of the strategies are extinct, a Nash equilibrium
is reached [FL99]. Reaching such a fixed point means that all pure strategies are
9Kalagnanam and Parkes report about recent developments in the area of computational game solver
[KP03]
10Replicator dynamics originate in theoretical biology, where they were intended to model shifts in the
proportions of genes or species of different fitness.
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equally performing well. Another, more plausible interpretation is that - in case
the proportions converge - all agents are following mixed strategies according to
the population proportions [RWMMO04]11. It is, however, not guaranteed that
the evolutionary tournament indeed converges. This is the major drawback of the
evolutionary tournament method12.
• Genetic Programming: Another evolutionary technique proposed for simulation
of social processes is genetic programming [Pri97]. Basically, agent behavior
is modeled as a mental process. This mental process corresponds to an internal
evolutionary algorithm. Not the entire strategies from the other agents (as in the
replicator dynamics example) but their decision processes are replicated. Broadly
speaking, when the decision process is conceived as a tree of operations, than this
tree mutates. The motivation [. . .] is to discover which kinds of strategies can
be maintained by a group in the face of any possibly strategy alternative. If a
successful alternative strategy exists, it may be found by the S¸mutantTˇ individual,
through conscious deliberation, or through trial and error, or through just plain
luck. If everyone is using a given strategy, and some other strategy can do better in
the environment of the current population, then someone is sure to find this better
strategy sooner or later [Axe84]. As with the evolutionary tournament technique,
it is also conceivable that evolutionary programming also fails to converge to a
stable strategy.
• Agent-Based Simulation: Intelligent software agents are computational entities
that can be viewed as perceiving and acting upon its environment and that is au-
tonomous in that its behavior at least partially depends on its own experience.
The use of autonomous interacting software-agents for representing economic
agents has brought up the research area of Agent-based Computational Economics
(ACE) [Tes02] building economies as independent evolving systems. Modelling
individual strategies enables economists to study markets, market behaviour and
its development over time and market microstructure under certain institutional
and environmental rules. Agents applied in simulations normally use simple de-
cision rules, learning algorithms, or statistical analysis to adapt their strategies.
[Tes02] provides a detailed overview on ACE research and describes studies of
market simulations in electricity and financial markets (for examples see also
[AHL+96, MY01, Pri97, SHC96, WCW04]).
11In other words, a mixed strategy equilibrium is found. It can be verified whether this equilibrium is
indeed a Nash equilibrium of the static game. In those cases the mixed strategy must be a best response
to itself.
12From the theoretical point of view, replicator dynamics have been criticized as an inadequate repre-
sentation of social processes. The main claim is that replicator dynamics reflect biological processes but
not social processes. An overview over the criticism can be found at [Cha98]
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2.3.2 Experimental Approach
The depiction of the axiomatic approach demonstrates that economic theory "is en-
dowed with numerous theories, which are judged on logical completeness" [Dux95].
However, those (consistent) theories are developed in rather abstract scenarios. A check,
whether those theories also hold in reality is a different question. Empirical tests and
evidence can fill this gap by providing means to verify or reject those theories. However,
there may be cases, where the available data are inadequate. This is where laboratory
experiments can step in. Laboratory experiments are a fairly inexpensive method to
generate data. The gist of laboratory experiments is their ability to create a test-bed,
in which all relevant influencing factors of the environment can be controlled. In such
a controlled environment it is possible to test theories or to discriminate between them
[Smi94]. Furthermore, by the use of experiments also the effect of (new) mechanisms
can be extracted, which are too complex to express them in a coherent formal model
[MRS93]13.
Apparently, there exists a tool not only for testing theory but also for economic per-
formance testing: Testbed experiments involve the actual implementation of a process.
The purposes of a testbed are to determine if the process can be implemented and how
it works once it is implemented. [. . .] More recently the terms "proof of principle" or
"proof of concept" have been used to capture the motivation and interpretation of the
research." [Plo94]. The use of laboratory experiments as engineering tool is not undis-
puted, though. The dispute stems from the fact that experiments abstract from reality
by sketching a simplified view upon the (socio-) economic environment. As such, "[. . .]
there is a question about the transferability of results from experiments" [LK98]. Two
popular streams of arguments have developed discussion the pros and cons of experi-
ments.
1. The first stream assumes that the agent behavior in laboratory experiments resem-
bles behavior in real settings. This implies that the results of experiments can be
directly transferred to real settings [EL93].
2. The second stream is a little bit more cautious, as it does not assume that behavior
in experimental and real settings are alike. It basically perceives that a theory that
does not hold even in a controlled environment of a laboratory experiment will
also fail in more complex real settings. On the other hand, there is no guaran-
tee that a theory that proves itself in an experimental setting will likewise do in
13Undoubtedly, there are many more reasons why experiments are important in economics. Smith for
example mentions five additional arguments. For example experiments can help to explain the causes
of theory’s failure. Furthermore, experiments are adequate to distinguish the robustness of mechanisms.
Last but not least experiments may serve as a source of empirical phenomena that needs explanation.
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real settings. That means negative results can automatically be transferred while
positive ones cannot.
What is undisputed is the fact that testbed experiments can reveal information about
the way institutions work on the performance. As such, experiments are an indispens-
able tool of Market Engineering. It provides the only method that can currently capture
the effect of the entire institution. As such, the experimental approach is currently state-
of-the art in testing innovative institutions [Mil04].
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Chapter 3
An Application for the Service Market
3.1 Environmental Analysis
When designing a market mechanism, one has to be aware of the underlying environ-
ment for which the market mechanism is to be designed. Thereby, the environment
description embraces information about the potential market participants, their needs,
the characteristics of the traded resources, and their endowments. Once the environment
description is available, the designer can elicit the requirements for the market mecha-
nism from the potential participants of that particular environment [Neu04b].
Corresponding to the engineering design process, the design stage comprises two
different phases: the environment definition and the requirement analysis.
3.1.1 Environment Definition
The market for trading services is spanned around service agents as sellers 1 (e.g. a PDF
creator service) and consumers as buyers (e.g. agents requesting a specific service).
The services in form of sellers sell one or more specific services and are responsible for
providing the traded services to the buyers and for procuring the required resources for
the services on the resource market (cf. chapter 4).
For instance, if a buyer is allocated a MP3 converter on the service market, the sell-
ing service agent is responsible for providing the software (in form of the MP3 service)
as well as the required resources (e.g. CPU, RAM, and hard disk for the conversion).
1From a technical point of view, a service can be interpreted as an agent selling different services
during a specific time span.
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The products traded on the service market are completly standardized. For example,
an instance of a PDF creator traded once does not differ from a PDF creator instance
traded at a later time.
The number of participants as well as the number of tradable services in a service
market is difficult to determine. In practice, there there exists no comparable market
at the moment. However, related markets (e.g. Seti@Home, Gnutella) as well as large
scaled markets (e.g. XETRA) may be a clue for determining the number of participants
and the number of different services:
Seti@Home Seti@Home was founded at the UC Berkley and enables users to par-
ticipate in the search for extra-terrestrial intelligence by analyzing data from the
Serendip radio telescope in Puerto Rico2. Seti@Home is a distributed system with
a central coordinator. Seti@Home has more than 5.000.000 people participating
in the network and more than 10.000 active users per day [Set05].
Gnutella Gnutella is a Peer-to-Peer file sharing system which allows users the world-
wide access and provision of information (e.g. music files). [AH00] analyzed
the network traffic and observed in a 24-hour period more than 35.000 connected
peers.
XETRA XETRA (Exchange Electronic Trading) is a worldwide electronic securities
trading system operated by the Deutsche Boerse Group in Germany. XETRA
implements a centralized auctioneer and, in peak times, handles at the German
Stock Exchange more than 500.000 orders a day [AG05].
Analyzing related systems and mechanisms gives a first impression of the number
of participants and the number of tradable services. However, a detailed analysis has to
be made in conjunction with the technical analysts in the CATNETS project.
Having analyzed the participants and the traded products of the service market, the
requirements which an adequate market mechanism for this environment has to fulfill
can be elicited.
3.1.2 Requirement Analysis
Ideally, the resulting market mechanism reflects the users’ requirements. For the service
market in the CATNETS scenario, the requirements stem from two areas: The theory of
Mechanism Design and the underlying service market environment.
2See http://setiathome.ssl.berkeley.edu/ for details (accessed: 04.02.2005).
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Requirements stemming from the Theory of Mechanism Design
The Theory of Mechanism Design takes a systematic look at market mechanisms and
their outcomes based on game theory [Jac02b]. Within the scope of Mechanism De-
sign it is the goal to investigate a mechanism that is applicable in certain situations.
Achieving this objective, the designed mechanism has to fulfill the following general
requirements [Jac02b, Par01a, Neu04b]:
Allocative Efficiency: The mechanism should determine an efficient allocation. As-
suming transferable utility among all participants, this is achieved if the total
value over all participants is maximized. Allocative efficiency can be defined in
an ex-post and ex-ante sense. Ex-ante efficiency takes preferences over expected
allocations in consideration, whilst ex-post analyzes preferences over realized al-
locations.
Budget Balancy: The property of budget balancy is concerned with whether the mech-
anism requires payments from outside the system or not. A mechanism is budget
balanced if all payments made to the mechanism are redistributed among the par-
ticipants. Neither funds from the system are removed nor is the system subsidized
from outcome. A weaker property is the concept of weak budged balance, i.e. net
payments are made from the participants to the mechanism, but no net payment
from the mechanism to the participants.
Incentive compatibility: A mechanism is required to be (approximated) incentive com-
patible. This is the case if all participants report their preferences truthfully. Par-
ticipants may not have an incentive to untruthfully report their preferences in or-
der to increase their individual utility. A mechanism is strategy-proofed if truthful
revelation of the preferences is a dominant-strategy equilibrium.
Individual rational: A mechanism is individual rational, if any participant achieves at
least as much utility from participating in the mechanism as without participating.
Computational tractability: Computational tractability considers the complexity of
computing the outcome of a mechanism based on the agent’s strategies [KP03].
With an increasing size of the message space the allocation problem can become
very demanding. Computational constraints may delimit the design of choice and
transfer rules.
Communication complexity: Communication complexity considers the minimization
of the amount of communication that is required to converge on a desirable global
outcome of the mechanism [San99]. With an increasing number of participants,
it is required that the communication effort is minimized.
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Requirements stemming from the service market environment
The requirements elicited from the mechanism design theory do, however, not fulfill all
requirements for the service market in the CATNETS scenario. The underlying envi-
ronment and its properties stem for more detailed and domain specific requirements as
elicited in the following:
Simultaneous trading: The mechanism for the service market requires that multiple
sellers and multiple buyers can trade and simultaneous. This can be realized by
providing a double auction mechanism. Furthermore, providing a double auc-
tion installs competition on both sides and is thus deemed promising to yield an
adequate allocation
Immediate service allocation: It is required that suitable buyer orders are matched im-
mediately with suitable seller orders. This requirement can be realized by provid-
ing a continuous trading mechanism.
No partial execution: The mechanism is required to avoid partial executions of ser-
vices. This bases on the fact, that a partial execution of a service is useless for a
buyer.
3.2 Meeting the Requirements
As shown in the environmental analysis (cf. Section 3.1), services can be characterized
as standardized resources. In this context, the use of auctions is an efficient way to
allocate these standardized resource, as well as to determine its prices. An auction is
characterized as a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining resource
allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the market participants [MM87a].
Treating auctions for standardized resources, five common auction formats are usu-
ally analyzed which will be introduced in the following. Figure 3.1 represents a classi-
fication schema for these auction formats based on [WWW01].
3.2.1 Single Sided Auctions
Single sided auctions are mechanisms, where only buyers or sellers can submit bids or
asks (1 : n or m : 1 relations). The most prominent single sided auctions are the Vickrey
Auction, the Dutch Auction, and the English Auction.
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Figure 3.1: Classification schema [WWW01]
Vickrey Auction The Vickrey auction is a sealed bid auction. The bidders submit one
single bid in a sealed envelope to the auctioneer. Finally, the bidder who submitted the
highest bid is awarded with the item at the price of the second highest bid. It can be
shown that truthfully bidding is a dominant strategy [GL77]. Thus, the English and the
Vickrey auction are dubbed strategically equivalent, as their strategies are alike.
Dutch Auction In the Dutch auction, the auctioneer calls out a price and lowers this
price incrementally as long as no bidder is willing to accept it. Once a bidder accepts
the pealed price this bidder wins the auction and has to pay his bid. As a strategy in the
Dutch Auction, the bidder has to define a price he is willing to accept [Mil89]. This price
will be below his valuation in order to draw positive utility from the auction. Bidding
below the own valuation is termed shading.
English Auction The English auction is the oldest and perhaps the most prevalent
auction format [Kri02]. Central to the English auction is the auctioneer, who conducts
the bidding process. More precisely, the auctioneer calls out a (low) price and increases
that price incrementally as long as there are more bidders interested. When the second
last bidder refuses to stay in the bidding process, the last bidder receives the item. Ob-
viously, the price the winner has to pay equals the second highest bid (if necessary the
CATNETS/2005/D1/v1.0 Revised Date 25
Environmental Analysis for Application Layer Networks
price is one increment higher to beat the second highest bid). The dominant strategy of
the English auction under private value settings can thus be headlined as pay up to your
valuation.
Single Sided auctions are – from an economic point-of-view – well understood and
applied successfully in different domains. However, single-sided auctions do not enable
the simultaneous and continuous trading of multiple buyers and multiple sellers. Re-
viewing the defined requirements in section 3.1.2, these auction types cannot be applied
for the service market in CATNETS.
3.2.2 Double Sided Auctions
Double-sided auctions or shortly double auctions are those auctions where competitive
bidding takes places on both sides (m : n relation). In comparison to traditional single-
sided auctions, double auctions have received much less attention by modern economic
theory.
For double auctions, where many buyers and many sellers compete against each
other, it is difficult to game-theoretically model the strategic behavior of buyers and
sellers [MM87b]. Thus, theoretical models typically focus on the very simple two sided
institutions, where agents engage directly in bargaining over the terms of exchange.
The k-double auction is thereby the simplest form of a double auction. In essence
buyers and sellers submit their bids in a sealed envelope to the auctioneer. The auc-
tioneer forms from the individual bids demand and supply schedules and determines
the prices where demand and supply are balanced. Using a given parameter k ∈ [0, 1]
a market clearing price p = (1 − k)a + kb is chosen from the interval [a, b] confin-
ing the range of all possible market clearing prices. Buyers with bids higher than this
market-clearing price will then trade to those sellers, who submitted lower bids than
the clearing price [SW02]. The k-double auction was initially introduced by [CS83].
Originally, they consider a bilateral-monopoly single unit-case with private values that
are independently drawn from known uniform distributions [Fri91]. In essence they find
linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium bidding strategies, which can miss mutually benefi-
cially trades with a positive probability. These inefficiencies can be explained by the fact
that both the buyers and sellers have an incentive to misrepresent their true preferences.
In this context, [MS83] show that in environments with incomplete information some
of those ex-post inefficiencies are inevitable [MS83]. However, [RSW94a] demonstrate
that these efficiency losses decrease, as the numbers of buyers and sellers increase. This
rise in efficiency occurs because each agent’s strategy converges rapidly towards truth-
ful reporting – in other words the agents become price-takers [RSW94a]. Accordingly,
the increase of agents induces a price taking behavior and thus increases the efficiency
of the double auction. [Wil85] introduces the many-buyer/many-seller double auction
model as a game of incomplete information. He also comes to the conclusion that dou-
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ble auctions are incentive efficient in large markets with strategic traders [Wil85].
A key consideration in double auctions is the timing of the clearing process, i.e.
the timing of determining the auction winners and thereby the allocation of the goods.
Double auctions can be either cleared continuously (Continuous Double Auction) or
periodically (Periodic Double Auction, Call Market):
Continuous Double Auction A Continuous Double Auction (CDA) is a double auc-
tion where buyers and sellers simultaneously and asynchronously announce bids and
offers. Whenever a new order enters the market, the auctioneer tries to clear the market
immediately. Thus, the CDA is advantageous especially in terms of immediacy.
Call Market A Call Market is a double auction with periodic uniform clearing, e.g.
the auctioneer clears the market every fives minutes. All orders in a period are collected
in an order-book and will be cleared periodically.
3.2.3 Summary
The review of the requirements elicited in section 3.1.2 implies, that the implementation
of a Continuous Double Auction (CDA) fits the defined requirements for the CATNETS’
service market.
Single sided auctions have the drawback to be either provider- or consumer-oriented
and thus asymmetric. Double auctions enable providers and consumers to offer bids
simultaneously and thus, the application of a double auction for the service market is
deemed promising.
The requirements stemmed from the theory of Mechanism Design (cf. Section 3.1.2)
can be (approximately) fulfilled by a CDA. It is possible to design an (approximative)
efficient 3, budget balanced, individual rational, and (approximative) incentive compat-
ible double auction mechanism. Furthermore, the computational and communication
complexities of a CDA are manageable in large-scaled markets. For instance, the XE-
TRA system at the German Stock Exchange also implements a (modified version) of a
CDA [AG05].
Furthermore, the requirements coming from environment of the service market (i.e.
simultaneous and continuous trading) can also be fulfilled by a CDA.
3[MS83] show that there cannot be any double auction (exchange) which is efficient, budget balanced,
and individual rational at the same time. However, [PKE01] show that the efficiency of an exchange can
be approximated while cleaving on the budget balance and individual rational properties.
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3.3 Testing
Mechanisms can be evaluated and compared according to many types of criteria. In
the following discussion, a set of common metrics for measuring the quality of markets
is outlined. However, a detailed and formalized criteria catalogue requires the formal-
izing of a concrete market mechanism and is thus deferred to future work. Table 3.1
summarizes the metrics which base on literature surveys of [Neu04b, Par01a, Bud03].
Group Criterion
Efficiency Allocative Efficiency
Informational Efficiency
Optimality Revenue Maximization
Correctness
Solution Stability
Feasibility Budget Balance
Incentive Feasibility
Tractability Communication Costs
Computation Costs
Table 3.1: Evaluation criteria
3.3.1 Efficiency
Efficiency denotes the capacity to produce desired results with a minimum expendi-
ture of energy, time, or resource [MW02]. Applied to market mechanisms, the criteria
allocative efficiency and informational efficiency can be defined:
Allocative Efficiency In order to measure allocative efficiency in a competitive frame-
work we have to evaluate the buyers and sellers surplus and payoffs. The Marshallian
aggregate surplus is
S =
I∑
i=1
φ(xi)−
J∑
j=1
cj(qj) (3.1)
It is a measure of welfare in a market, or more precisely, of the total utility generated
by consumption less the costs of production. In order to compute it, we have to know
agents’ reservation prices and the actual transactions prices in every period. Buyer’s
payoff is given by the difference between his own reservation value v and the actual
price p. Similarly, seller’s payoff is the difference between the price p and his reservation
value s. Overall welfare can be formalized as follows:
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S =
I∑
i=1
(vi − pi) +
J∑
j=1
(pj − sj) (3.2)
Competitive equilibrium results from the maximizing behavior assumption of agents.
Overall welfare as defined in (3.2) is maximized in equilibrium and therefore the re-
sulting allocation is efficient in the Paretian sense. The concept of Pareto efficiency
is deeply rooted in the individualistic methodology on which competitive equilibrium
analysis is built. Indeed a market allocation is Pareto superior to another one if the wel-
fare of at least one agent in the economy has been improved without reducing the welfare
of another agent. Under the assumption of stability of demand and supply curves it is
possible to compute efficiency by evaluating equilibrium quantity x∗ as the quantity in
correspondence of the intersection of market curves. Thus, a measure of efficiency is
the ratio between actual market quantity qt and potential one x∗,
eff =
qt
x∗t
(3.3)
Informational Efficiency Markets are informational efficient if prices reflect all rel-
evant information available. Such a definition is linked to the rational expectation hy-
pothesis, which states that agents do not make systematic errors in forecasting future
prices. If such a condition holds, observed price dynamics can be informative about in-
formation held by traders. More precisely, information asymmetries among traders are
needed for prices having an informational role. If this is the case traders can infer oppor-
tunities from prices and prices are affected by knowledge of trading opportunities. The
foregoing dynamics can be reflected in prices as well as in bids and ask. In [Fri93a] the
mean square deviation of actual price from rational expectation price is proposed as a
metric for informational efficiency, in that it captures the tendency of price mechanisms
to spread right information among traders. Another metrics is the bid and ask spread.
If traders learn observing previous bids then informational efficiency would require a
bid-ask spread shrinking to 0.
3.3.2 Optimality
Revenue Maximization An allocation is Pareto optimal if the welfare of at least one
agent in the economy cannot be ameliorated without reducing the welfare of some other
agent in the economy. A metric is the ratio of total payoffs actually earned by all traders
- as stated in equation (3.2 - and theoretical payoffs that could be earned by all traders
in equilibrium. In order to investigate the optimality of the mechanism (decentralized or
centralized) we measure the distribution of profits across individuals which is [GS93]:
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√∑
i(ai − πi)2
n
(3.4)
where ai are actual payoffs and πi are theoretical payoffs.
Correctness In a dynamic settings like ALN and a CDA or Call Market, the mecha-
nisms involved have to be evaluated on the basis of the average number of times that a
mechanism has approached the optimal allocation. This criterion is called "correctness"
and according to [Par01b] can provide a more sensitive metrics of performance than
efficiency.
3.3.3 Solution
Stability In a decentralized bilateral exchange setting, a measure of stability is the
coefficient of convergence of prices to equilibrium values, that is defined as the ratio
between standard deviation of actual prices and the predicted equilibrium price. The
latter in turn is given by the intersection of demand and supply curves. Related to this
metrics is the "time" of convergence i.e. time elapsed until the aforementioned ratio has
shrunk to zero.
3.3.4 Feasibility
[Jac02a] argues that "A theme that comes out of the literature is that it is often im-
possible to find mechanisms compatible with individual incentives that simultaneously
result in efficient decisions (maximizing total welfare), the voluntary participation of
the individuals, and balanced transfers (taxes and subsidies that always net out across
individuals)".
Incentive Feasibility In many mechanisms market agent interactions lead to strategic
behaviour. If an agent knows that he can influence final price - and then his own payoff
- he can report bids untruthfully [RSW94b]. Thus, mechanisms have to be evaluated
with respect to the propensity of agents to report the truth values of goods in transac-
tions. Actually, convergence to equilibrium can be attained also if traders use strategy
of untruthful report their preferences, determining inefficiency (as a result some traders
can stay out market also if they are willing to trade). [RSW94b] measure the foregoing
feature, by evaluating the ratio of expected gains from trade across all agents in equi-
librium and the expected gains from trade across all trades in equilibrium assuming that
CATNETS/2005/D1/v1.0 Revised Date 30
Environmental Analysis for Application Layer Networks
all agents behave as price takers. Incentive compatible mechanisms must be such that
this ratio4 to equals 1.
3.3.5 Tractability
Communication Costs [Hay45] works out the idea that in standard environments,
the Walrasian mechanism is "informationally efficient," in that it realizes Pareto effi-
cient allocations with the least amount of communication. The Walrasian mechanism
involves only the announcement of prices, along with the allocation, which is much
more economical than full revelation of agents’ preferences. [NS01] examine problem
communication establishing a lower bound of numbers of message needed to ensure
efficient outcome. Thus a metric for this feature is the number of bids in transaction
needed to approach the efficient outcome.
Computation Costs [Axt99] studies the complexity of exchange and establishes a
lower bound of interactions between agents needed to ensure an efficient outcome. In
this respect a metrics is the number of interactions which allows allocative efficiency.
In general, this measure is exponential in the number of commodities and agents.
4A bidder’s expected payoff is: e = (expectedgain− expectedpayment) ∗ probabilityofwinning.
[GO02]
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Chapter 4
An Application for the Resource
Market
4.1 Environmental Analysis
Having defined the environment for trading the services, the corresponding market for
trading the resources has to be designed. The environment for designing a resource
market can be compared to the environments found in the Grid, Peer-to-Peer, and Dis-
tributed Computing literature. These research areas - especially the research done in the
area of Computational Grids - build the base for the following analysis.
4.1.1 Environment Definition
The participants in the resource market are those agents selling services in the service
market as resource consumers (buyers) and a set of resource owners (sellers) offering
computer resources.
Figure 4.1 outlines the resource market of the CATNETS scenario. Suppose a PDF
service allocated a service on the service market and now requires computer resources
for executing the service (e.g. a 700MHz CPU, 512MB RAM, and a 10GB hard disk).
The agent with the instantiated PDF service acts as resource consumer (buyer) and the
agents owning computer resource act as sellers.
In analogy to the service market, it is difficult to determine an approximated number
of participants in a market for trading computer resource. At the moment, there is
no existing commercial market place for trading such resources. However, there exist
several test-beds and experimental evaluation studies which serve as clues. Table 4.1
lists exemplarily a selection of test-beds found in the Grid, Peer-to-Peer, and Distributed
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Figure 4.1: resource market
Computing literature.
Name Resources Users Jobs/Day
Grid 2003 Project 700 102 1300
NorduGrid 1300
Conrell Center 512 512 800
San Diego 1152 468 250
PlanetLab 350 350
Table 4.1: Grid and Computing test-beds statistics
Grid 2003 Project: The Grid2003 Project deploys a multi-virtual organization and application-
driven Grid laboratory. The project sustained the production-level services for
several months which were required by several different research institutes (e.g.
for physics experiment, gravitational wave search) [FGG+04]. In peak times, the
system handled 1300 simultaneous jobs.
NorduGrid: The NorduGrid1 project provides a Grid infrastructure by adapting ex-
isting Grid middleware components (e.g. Globus Toolkit). In peak times, the
NorduGrid handled about 1300 jobs per day.
Cornell Theory Center: The Cornell Theory Center is a high-performance computing
center which supports scientific and engineering research projects. The center has
1See http://www.nordugrid.org/ and http://grid.uio.no/atlas/nglogger/
nglogger_info/ for details (accessed: 10.02.2005).
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over 500 CPUs and handled over 800 jobs per day2 in peak times.
San Diego Supercomputer: The San Diego Supercomputer Center hosts a cluster with
over 1100 processors. The average number of jobs executed per day was measured
with 250 [EHY02]. The workload of this center served also as a benchmark for
several scheduling architectures, e.g. the workload was used in [EHY02].
PlanetLab: PlanetLab is a distributed overlay platform to support the deployment and
evaluation of planetary-scale network services [BBC+04]. It includes over 350
machines located in over 20 different countries.
Besides several test-beds, there exits simulation settings for evaluating the perfor-
mance of different Grid components (e.g. scheduler, resource manager). For instance,
[IF01] used in their setting 10,000 resources, 5,000 different users, and 100 jobs per day.
[KDJN03] did a performance evaluation with 500 different users. [RS04] used 6,000
different resources for their simulation setting.
Similar to the analysis for the environment for the service market, the related sys-
tems and similation settings give a first impression of the number of participants and the
number of jobs. Moreover, the number of participants in the resource market strongly
depends on the number of participants (i.e. service agents) in the service market. There-
fore, a detailed analysis has to be made in conjunction with the service market environ-
ment as well as with the technical analysts in the CATNETS project.
The transaction objects in the resource market are non standardized capacity-type
objects. Capacity (e.g. processing power) not used in a time-period t is worthless at
a later time-period t + 1. Furthermore, the same resources (e.g. CPUs) can differ in
their capacities, e.g. a computing engine can be a high-performance processor capable
of processing billions of FLOPS3, as well as a low-performance processor of a mobile
hand-held computer. Therefore, computer resources can be described by a set of possi-
ble attributes and its characteristics. For instance, a hard disk can be characterized by its
quality attributes capacity (in Gigabyte (GB)), access time (in milliseconds (ms)), and
data throughput (in bits per second (bits/s)).
The set and the number of possible different transaction objects in the resource mar-
ket (e.g. resources like CPUs, hard-disks) are not specified in detail. Surveying the
literature, a common set of possible resources can be identified. [CS01] introduce a
base set of resource types that have to be supported within a resource management
2See http://www.cs.huji.ac.il/labs/parallel/workload/ for details (accessed
05.01.2005)
3FLOPS stands for floating point instructions per second and is an approximate measure of a com-
puter’s processing speed.
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mechanism: Computer resources (CPU, GPU), storage resources (memory, disk, tape),
network resources (HPC switch, LAN, WAN), and miscellaneous resources (guest ac-
count, quota protocol). [BM02] and [KC02] abstract to the following five resources:
processor, memory, storage, I/O, and network.
Following the above definitions of the environment and surveying the Grid literature,
the simplified picture in Figure 4.2 can be adapted as a market place for the resource
market [CFK04]. In essence, the market for trading computer resources (e.g. for trad-
ing in Computational Grid resources) is spanned around the resource owners as sellers
(e.g. IBM or Sun with their computer centers), the resource consumers as buyers (e.g.
scientists at universities, rendering or the biochemical firms) and some intermediaries
(e.g. Condor, Gallop, Legion etc.). The intermediaries technically provide the resource
management infrastructure for exploiting remote resources.
Application
Information Service
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Application
Application
Application
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RSL 
specialization
Requests
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RSL
Local
Resource
Manager
Local
Resource
Manager
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Figure 4.2: The market for Computational Grids
According to the resource management architecture proposed by [CFK04] the inter-
mediary layer consists of three basic components:
Resource Broker: The resource broker components are responsible for resource dis-
covery, selection, aggregation, and subsequently for the data and program trans-
portation [CB02]. By transforming the resources to the consumers’ requirements
(which are specified for instance in the Resource Specification Language (RSL))
into a set of jobs that are self-reliantly scheduled on the appropriate resources
(i.e. RSL specialization) and subsequently managed, the complexity of the re-
source market is concealed [VBW04]. For the market participants, the resource
broker is apparently more of a black box. A Resource Broker may also include a
matchmaking between multiattribute offers and request [Vei03].
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Resource Information Manager: The resource information manager provides perva-
sive access to information about the current availability and capability of re-
sources [CFK04].
Allocator: The allocator coordinates the allocation of resources at multiple sites. Ob-
viously, the allocator and the information service assume the responsibility of
(meta-) scheduling the jobs.
Based upon this view on the intermediary layer, the market mechanism for the re-
source market can be – in analogy to a market mechanism for the Computational Grid
– sketched as follows: The transition from an intermediary layer to a mediated market
mechanism is not too far. In essence, the scheduling performed by the resource broker
can be shifted to the market mechanism. Instead of sending requests to the informa-
tion service, the resource broker can translate the user requirements into bids. Those
bids expressing demand and supply situation are subsequently cleared by the market
mechanisms [SNW04].
4.1.2 Requirement Analysis
Despite the classical mechanism design requirements pertaining to the mechanism as
described in section 3.1.2, the mechanism for the resource market must also account for
the underlying environment. For the resource market the requirements stemming from
the underlying environment are the following [SNW04]:
Simultaneous trading and immediate resource allocation: In analogy to the service
market requirements, the market mechanism for the resource market has to sup-
port the simultaneous trading of multiple buyers and sellers, as well as an imme-
diate resource allocation. Again, this can be realized by providing a continuous
double auction mechanism.
Trading dependent resources: In the resource market, buyers usually demand a com-
bination of computer resources as bundles to perform a task [SMT02]. This is
based on the fact that computer resources (e.g. in the Computational Grid) are
complementarities. Complementarities are resources with superadditive valua-
tions (v(A) + v(B) ≤ v(AB)), as the sum of the valuations for the single re-
sources is less than the valuation for the whole bundle.
Suppose, for example, a buyer intending to render images requires hard disk,
CPU, and main memory. If any component of the bundle, say the CPU, is not
allocated to him, the remaining bundle has no value for him since the rendering
cannot be processed without the CPU. In order to avoid the exposure risk (i.e.
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receiving only one part of the bundle4 without the other), the mechanism must
allow for bids on bundles. Likewise, the seller can also express bids on bundles.
Support for multiattribute resources: Resources in the resource market are typically
not completely standardized, as similar resources can differ in their quality. A
hard disk can be characterized by its quality attributes capacity (in Gigabyte
(GB)), access time (in milliseconds (ms)), and data throughput (in bits per second
(bits/s)). For example, a rendering job requiring a minimum amount of GB 250
GB can be conducted by a 500 GB hard disk; however, it can not be executed
by a 100 GB hard disk. As such, minimum quality requirements must be met,
while similar resources of superior quality work as well. Hence, minimum qual-
ity requirements must be met, while similar resources of superior quality work as
well5.
Furthermore, buyers usually require resources only for a certain time span. Hav-
ing conducted the computation, there is typically no further use for the resources.
The exact timing of the computation is not always that important for the buyer.
For instance, the buyer may be indifferent whether the job is performed at 10 a.m.
or at 11 a.m., as long as the job is finished at a certain time, e.g. 3 p.m. There-
fore, the market mechanism must allow (i) an advanced reservation (AR), which
is a process of requesting resources for use at a specific time in the future and (ii)
placing bids on time ranges [SIT00].
Partial execution on the sellers side: A seller of resources (e.g. an owner of a scaled
server farm) is also willing to sell just a part of the offered resources. Thus, the
possibility of a partial executing on the sellers’ side must be given.
Co-Allocation: Scientific applications (e.g. genetic disease research) require more re-
sources than any single seller could provide. As such, an allocation from multiple
sites (or in short co-allocation6) is indispensable. In this case a set of resources is
made available simultaneously by coordinating on-demand agreements across the
required resources [CFK04].
4.2 Meeting the Requirements
A number of mechanisms have been proposed that attempt to solve the resource alloca-
tion problem in such a resource market or related architectures. Most of these mecha-
nisms are central in nature in a way that the allocation problem is solved by a central
4A bundle denotes a combination of resources.
5The network congestion can also be included by the use of attributes. Therefore, network congestion
metrics have to be defined and evaluated in future work, e.g. [Wol98], [Loe04]
6In this context, the term co-allocation is equivalent to the term co-scheduling.
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entity using global optimization algorithms without the employment of prices. This cen-
tral entity requires detailed information about the demand and supply situation in order
to be effective. As information is dispersed among the buyers and sellers, central allo-
cation algorithms may not enfold their full power, because this information requirement
is not even closely met. Market-based approaches incorporate incentives for truthful
information revelation by implementing prices.
Surveying the literature, various mechanisms for allocating computer resources adapt
classical auction mechanism for standardized products as described in section 3.2. Fur-
thermore, there exists a number of multiattribute, bundle, or combinatorial mechanisms,
which can be used to trade dependent and non-standardized products. Both types of
mechanisms and their applicability for the resource market will be discussed in the fol-
lowing.
4.2.1 Classic Auction Types
There exists a number of economic resource allocation systems which adapt classical
auction mechanisms (e.g. English auctions) for Peer-to-Peer networks and Grid Com-
puting infrastructures7.
SPAWN: The SPAWN system provides a market mechanism for trading CPU times
in a network of workstations [WHH+92]. SPAWN treats computer resources a
standardized commodities and implements a Vickrey auction.
POPCORN: POPCORN 8 provides an infrastructure for global distributed computa-
tion [RN98, NLRC88]. POPCORN mainly consists of three entities: (i) A parallel
programm which requires CPU time (buyer), (ii) a CPU seller, and (iii) a market
which serves as a meeting place and matchmaker for the buyers and sellers. Buy-
ers of CPU time can bid for one single commodity, which can be traded executing
a Vickrey auction repeatedly.
OCEAN: OCEAN9 (Open Computation Exchange and Arbitration Network) is a market-
based infrastructure for high-performance computation, such as Cluster and Grid
computing environments [ACD+01, PHP+03]. The major components of the
OCEAN’s market infrastructure are user components, computational resources,
and the underlying market mechanism (e.g. the OCEAN Auction Component).
7A detailed overview of classical auctions in resource allocation systems is given among others in
[KBM02].
8See http://www.cs.huji.ac.il/labs/popcorn/(accessed:20.12.2004) for de-
tails
9See http://www.cise.ufl.edu/research/ocean/,(accessed:20.12.2004) for
details
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In the OCEAN framework, each user (i.e. resource provider or consumer) is
represented by a local OCEAN node. The OCEAN node implements the core
components of the system, for instance a Trader Component, an Auction Com-
ponent, or a Security Component. The implemented OCEAN auctions occur
in a distributed Peer-to-Peer manner. The auction mechanism implemented in
the OCEAN framework can be interpreted as a distributed sealed-bid continu-
ous double-auction [ACD+01]. A trade is proposed to the highest bidder and the
lowest seller. Afterwards, the trading partner can renegotiate their service level
agreements.
G-Commerce: G-Commerce provides a framework for trading computer resources
(CPU and hard disk) in commodity markets and Vickrey auctions [WPBB01a,
WPBB01b, WBPB03].
Stanford Peers: The Stanford Peers model is a Peer-to-Peer system which implements
auctions within a cooperative bartering model in a cooperative sharing environ-
ment [CGM02]. It simulates storage trading for content replication and archiving.
It demonstrates distributed resource trading policies based on auctions by simula-
tion.
Reviewing the requirements on the mechanism, it becomes evident that the previous
described mechanisms fail to satisfy the requirements of a resource market. Especially
the negligence of time attributes for bundles and quality constraints for single resources
diminish the use of the proposed market mechanisms.
4.2.2 Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges
Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges comprise dependencies between resources and
have attained a lot of attention in the last few years [BN03, Gra04, JV04, Par01a,
SSGL02]. Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges allow to submit logical concatenated
bids like AND bids, OR bids, and XOR bids. The use of these auction types is crucial
if resources are complementarities or substitutes. Due to their capability of guarantee-
ing ”all-or-nothing”10 bids, their application for trading computer resources is deemed
promising.
At the moment, there exists different combinatorial and bundle mechanisms which
can be classified as sketched in figure 4.3:
Generalized Vickrey Auction: The Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) is a Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves mechanisms (cf. Vickrey Auction) and implements a single shot
10For instance, a bid on a bundle {CPU, RAM, HDD} will only be executed if all components of the
bundle can be allocated.
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Figure 4.3: A classification of bundle and combinatorial auction types
and sealed bid second-price approach for combinatorial auctions. As the single
item Vickrey auction, the GVA is strategy-proof, i.e. truthful bidding is a domi-
nant strategy [GL77].
However, the mechanism is single sided and, thus, does not generate competition
on both sides. Furthermore, the GVA treats the traded resources as standardized
commodities and does not support quality characteristics. Besides, the computa-
tional tractability of the GVA is very high [Par01a].
Dutch Combinatorial Auctions: In a Dutch Combinatorial Auction, the auctioneer
calls out a price for each bundle and lowers this price incrementally as long as
no bidder is willing to accept it. An implementation of a Dutch Combinatorial
Auction can be found in [BN03]. However, the auction is single-sided and does
not support quality characteristics of resources.
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Iterative Combinatorial Auctions adapt English Auc-
tions for the combinatorial case [AM02, Par99]. Iterative combinatorial auctions
are the most prominent combinatorial mechanisms - however; their applicability
on the resource market is not possible due to the neglect of multiattribute bids and
multiple sellers and buyers.
Bundle Exchanges: Bundle exchanges are double auctions with support AND con-
catenated bids on bundles. In contrast to combinatorial auctions and exchanges,
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these auctions types neglect the use of XOR bids. An implementation of a bundle
exchange can be found in [GVW04].
Classical bundle mechanisms neglect the support of quality characteristics which
disables their direct applicability for the resource market. However, with respect
to the requirements for the resource market, a bundle exchange may be a base
mechanism for future research.
Combinatorial Exchanges: Combinatorial exchanges are double auctions that support
combinatorial orders. [PKE01] introduce the first combinatorial exchange as a
single-shot sealed bid auction. [BN03, Bis04] propose an iterative combinator-
ial exchange based on a primal/dual programming formulation of the allocation
problem. However, both approaches neither account for time nor for quality con-
straints and are thus not directly applicable for the resource market. However, the
ability of trading dependent resources simultaneously qualifies a Combinatorial
Exchange to meet most of the requirements on the Resource Market.
Reviewing the requirements on the mechanism, it becomes obvious that the previous
described mechanisms fail to satisfy these requirements. Especially the negligence of
time attributes for bundles and quality constraints for single resources diminish the use
of the proposed market mechanisms. The introduction of time attributes redefines the
allocation problem to a type of scheduling problem.
To account for time attributes, Wellman et al. model single-sided auction proto-
cols for the allocation and scheduling of resources under consideration of different time
constraints [WWWMM01]. Conen goes one step further by designing a combinatorial
bidding procedure for job scheduling including different running, starting, and ending
times of jobs on a processing machine [Con02]. Both approaches are, however, single-
sided and thus do not create competition on both sides.
4.2.3 Summary
Reviewing the requirements for a resource market, it becomes obviously that none of
the presented classical auction types and combinatorial mechanisms is directly applica-
ble for the resource market. None of the mechanisms comprise at the same time si-
multaneous bids of multiple sellers and buyers, time and quality constraints as well as
combinatorial bids.
The future work in the CATNETS project intends to tailor a mechanism for allocat-
ing computer resources by converting the aforementioned approaches into a combina-
torial or bundle exchange that additionally incorporates time and quality constraints.
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4.3 Testing
The metrics described in 3.3 are quite general and can be usefully exploited also for
measuring the performance of the resources market. Thus, the reader is referred to that
section for a list and an explanation of market performance metrics. In what follows,
we simply discuss some problems related to the existence of a competitive equilibrium,
that arise due to the very specific structure of the market for resources. In particular,
the design of such a market must allow for the trading of dependent as well as for multi
attribute resources. Put differently, resources in any bundle to be traded are complemen-
tary goods for buyers (e.g. a positive amount hard-disk storage capacity with a zero cpu
is worthless for a buyer). Moreover, there are minimum quality requirements on them
(e.g. because a service task requires an hard disk capacity of 100Gb at least).
We can formalize the foregoing requirements by saying that buyers in resources’
market have the following Leontief utility function:
Ui(x1, x2, x3, ..., xn) = min {bi1x1, bi2x2, bi3x3, ..., binxn} (4.1)
where (x1, x2, x3, ..., xn) are resources included in a bundle of dimension n. Equa-
tion (4.1) simply states that any resource xk in a bundle must be present in the non-
negative proportion bik in order to give utility to buyer i. If those proportions are not
respected a bundle is worthless to a buyer.
If buyers’ preferences are like those specified in (4.1) problems may arise with the
existence of a competitive equilibrium, and thereby with the use of all metrics based
on it11. Indeed, Leontief preferences may lead to an individual demand function for
resources’ bundles like the one displayed in Figure 4.4
In the Figure, the agent i is willing to buy the bundle Xi at any price less or equal Pi
whereas for any price above that threshold his demand is zero. This situation may occur
if complementarities among resources are strongly enough to induce the agent to not
substitute bundle Xi for another one with different resources proportions as the price
goes down. Similarly, this aversion for substitution can induce the agent to prefer to not
consume anything if the price for the preferred bundle is too high.
The situation represented in Figure 4.4 can be deleterious for the existence of a
competitive equilibrium. Indeed, suppose every buyer in the resource market behaves
like buyer i. Then, the situation displayed in Figure 4.5 may occur. As the figure shows,
aggregate supply of bundles - i.e. the sum of individual supply functions - does not
cross aggregate demand, that in this case is equal to n-replicas of the individual demand
function of buyer i. Accordingly, the competitive equilibrium does not exist.
The foregoing problems can nonetheless be solved if buyers’ individual characteris-
tics - i.e. preferences and/or budget constraints - are heterogeneous enough. If that is the
case the situation can be like the one depicted in Figure 4.3, where only four individuals
11For a thorough analysis of these problems see [CWG95].
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are assumed to be present. In that picture, all individuals have the same preferences
structure as agent i in Figure 4.4. Nevertheless, they are heterogenous with respect to
the preferred bundle as well as with respect to the maximum price each one is willing
to pay. Aggregating over this kind of individuals leads to an aggregate demand which
is positive for different price-bundle couples (and not just for one as in Figure 4.5). Ide-
ally, the more buyers are heterogeneous the more aggregate demand will tend to be a
continuous function, thereby assuring the existence of a competitive equilibrium.
Summarizing, the structure of the resources’ market - in which agents have Leontief
Preferences over resources - is in general not an obstacle for the use of metrics described
in section 3.3, granted that buyers’ characteristics are heterogeneous enough. In this
respect, measures of characteristics dispersion - as for example the variance of minimum
quality requirements - can be complementary metrics to measure the performance of that
market.
Figure 4.4: Example of Individual Demand when preferences are Leontief.
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Figure 4.5: Example in which a competitive equilibrium may not exist if preferences
are Leontief.
Figure 4.6: Example in which a competitive equilibrium can be restored if preferences
of buyers are heterogeneous.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The key issue in this work is the structured identification and definition of market mech-
anisms for the application layer networks. In completing deliverable 1 in work package
1 with this document the aim is to generate input for the following parts of the CAT-
NETS project:
• Carrying out deliverable 2 in work package 1 that aims on the composition of the
market mechanisms for simulation issues. Within this second part of the work
package, specification and concepts for simulation and measurement of ALN sce-
narios are analyzed.
• Providing input for deliverable 2 in work package 3 that aims on the specifica-
tion and implementation of services within the ALN middleware developed in
CATNETS.
• Providing input for deliverable 2 in work package 4 that aims on the definition of
the agent architecture for the simulator that will be implemented in CATNETS.
Hence, we provide a summary on the results of this report in Section 5.1 and an
outlook on the next steps to be taken in Section 5.2.
5.1 Review of this Work
This work comprises several parts. Firstly, a centralized market perspective for appli-
cation layer networks is drawn. Here, two markets are distinguished: a service and a
resource market. The service market is used by customer agents that aim on purchasing
a certain service in order to fulfil a tasks. The second market – the resource market –
is the market on which the service instances trade the resources they need in order to
operate the offered services (compare Chapter 1).
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The approach which is chosen in both cases in order to design the market character-
istics is the so called Market Engineering appraoch (compare Chapter 2). This approach
is based on a process including several steps to define markets in a structured way. The
process is accompanied by a set of well chosen methods that are consequently applied
in the definition phase of the market mechanisms for ALNs in the CATNETS project.
Next to defining and implementing as well as testing market mechanisms, this approach
also employs means of experimental analysis and computerized simulation for the eval-
uation of market mechanisms. An important source is the work done in the domain of
meachanism design and economic engineering in past years.
In the following, the Market Engineering approach is employed for the service and
the resource market (compare Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). As a result of the analysis of the
requirements for the service market, a specific type of a continuous double auction will
be envisaged to implement CATNETS project. The result of the analyis of the require-
ments for the resource market provided to suggest a kind of bundle or combinatorial
market mechanism to be implemented.
Within this report the focus lies on several issues: One central issue is the introduc-
tion of the Market Engineering approach. Consequently, this approach is applied to both
markets in the CATNETS project. Finally, the classes of mechanisms which are aimed
to be implemented for these markes have been identified.
5.2 Outlook on Next Steps
The next steps in work package 1 comprise several issues. In order to proceed with
the detailed definition of market mechanisms for the service and the resource market,
in depth knowledge in the field of mechanism design has to be gathered. Therefore,
further literatur review is essentially. Within the ongoing work in this package, the
market mechanisms will be defined formally and described in an implementation ready
manner.
The output of this process will feed the definition and the impelementation of the
simulator. Therefore, there will be taken a look on the economic metrics that allow the
measurement of the quality of the chosen market mechanisms. Measuring efficiency is
essential in order to vary market mechanisms further and to converge to high quality
mechanisms.
The output of this report will also feed into the definition and implementation process
of the service implementation in the CATNETS middleware. Here, more specific defin-
tions of the market mechanisms are focussed and a close cooperation with the middle-
ware work package is panned.
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The next steps in this work package are the formal defintion and the in depth elabo-
ration of economic market mechanisms that meet the outlined desiderata.
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ISSN
Die zunehmende Vernetzung von Rechners über 
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